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3.1.2 Bils-Klenow distribution: BK – GTEAbstract
This paper adopts the Impulse-Response methodology to under-
stand in￿ation persistence. It has often been argued that existing
models of pricing fail to explain the persistence that we observe. We
adopt a common general framework which allows for an explicit mod-
elling of the distribution of contract lengths and for di￿erent types of
price setting. In particular, we ￿nd that allowing for a distribution
of contract lengths can yield a more plausible explanation of in￿ation
persistence than indexation.
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September 2006Non-Technical Summary
The persistence of in￿ation is a central issue both for economic policy
makers and for theorists. For policy makers the issue is how far they should
look forward and how rapidly their policy actions take e￿ect. For theorists,
the issue is to what extent the theories are consistent with the empirical
evidence on persistence. There are two main sources of evidence raised to
support the idea that in￿ation is persistent. One is the simple fact that the
current level of in￿ation will not be far away from in￿ation in the previous
quarters (there is high autocorrelation)..Second, there is the evidence of vec-
tor autoregressions (VARS). These introduce another dimension: the shape
and timing of the response of in￿ation to monetary policy. It is widely agreed
that there is a delayed response of in￿ation to monetary policy: the maxi-
mum e￿ect of policy occurs sometime after the policy: this is the so-called
hump-shaped response.
In this paper, we consider this issue from a boarder perspective. We
put a wide range of competing frameworks for modelling nominal rigidities
in Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) models into a general framework
that allows for an explicit and consistent examination of the distribution of
contract lengths and its relation to the in￿ation dynamics. We then evaluate
the performance of alternative models based on their potential to account for
all the key aspects of the in￿ation dynamics resulting from monetary shocks.
The key features which we consider are that the biggest e￿ect is not on
impact (there is a hump), the timing of the peak impact, and how the e￿ect
dies away. Due to the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the timing
of the hump peak, we allow for three di￿erent values which corresponds to
the moderate view (the impact on in￿ation reaches its maximum after 8
quarters), the Hawkish view (after 12 quarters) and the Dove view (after 4
quarters). We also examine whether models’ predictions are consistent with
the common view that in￿ation peaks after output, and the gap between the
two peaks is about 4 quarters.
We ￿rst clarify the dimensions along which models do and do not match
the in￿ation dynamics observed in the data. We then discuss what would
be required in terms of contract length, distribution of contract lengths and
parameters values for a model that accounts for all three key aspects of
in￿ation dynamics in response to a monetary shock.
We ￿nd that all of the models have a hump-shaped response except for
Calvo, which never has a hump. At standard parameter values, in models
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September 2006with one type of contract length in￿ation always reaches its peak at the end
of the contract length. As a result, the only way to get a hump at more than
4 quarters is to have long average contract lengths, which contradicts the
microevidence that prices/wages adjust frequently. Models with a distribu-
tion of contract lengths do not fare better. With plausible parameter values,
most models cannot even make in￿ation peak at 4Q: On the other hand,
models with one type of contract length fail to generate enough persistence,
whereas models with a distribution of contract lengths do not have problem
in generating a persistent in￿ation response with plausible parameter values.
We then examine what happens when we vary the key parameter ￿, which
measures the sensitivity of the optimal ￿exible wage to output. We ￿nd
that as this becomes lower, models with a distribution without long average
contract length have humps at 8Q and beyond. In addition, the predictions
of such models are also consistent with the common view that in￿ation peaks
after output, and the gap between the two peaks is about 4 quarters.
In order to generate the observed in￿ation dynamics, the common ap-
proach in the literature is to graft indexation onto the Calvo model. We
￿nd that the assumption of indexation can also a￿ect the timing of the in-
￿ation hump, having a larger e￿ect on the in￿ation peak in models with a
distribution. However, as Woodford(2006) points out lack of direct evidence
for indexation makes this type of model less plausible as an explanation of
in￿ation dynamics in the US or Euro Area.
Our results indicate that whilst the distribution of contract lengths alone
cannot fully account for observed in￿ation dynamics, it can be a power-
ful mechanism in generating observed in￿ation dynamics in a multi-friction
model. More importantly, this suggests an alternative to ad hoc and unreal-
istic assumption of indexation.
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The persistence of in￿ation is a central issue both for economic policy makers
and for theorists. For policy makers the issue is how far should they look
forward and how rapidly their policy actions take e￿ect. For theorists, the
issue is to what extent the theories are consistent with the empirical evidence
on persistence. There are two main sources of evidence raised to support the
idea that in￿ation is persistent. One is the autocorrelation of in￿ation. If
you regress in￿ation on itself the coe￿cients on lagged in￿ation will be quite
high. Clark (2005) found for the US that the sum of the AR coe￿cients
for the aggregate in￿ation series are about 0.9. Pivetta and Reis (2004)
found evidence that in￿ation persistence has been high and approximately
unchanged in the United States between 1947 and 2001. Batini (2002) found
that for the Euro zone 1970-2002, AR(5) coe￿cients sum to around 0.7:
this varied at individual country level. Whilst some studies argue that the
coe￿cient is reduced if you allow for structural breaks and regime switches1,
few would argue for coe￿cients near to zero. Second, there is the evidence
of VARS. These introduce another dimension: the shape and timing of the
response of in￿ation to monetary policy. It is widely agreed that there is
a delayed response of in￿ation to monetary policy: the maximum e￿ect of
policy occurs sometime after the policy: there is a hump-shaped response.
Views about the timing of the peak di￿er. The traditional view was put
forward by Friedman: monetary policy has "long and unpredictable lags":
the impact on in￿ation would be as long as 8 quarters or even more. Cer-
tainly, this is the view taken by the Bank of England: when setting monetary
policy, the MPC looks 8 quarters ahead2. The ECB takes the view that the
maximum impact is 6 quarters. Di￿erent researchers have estimated the
response from 4 quarters Smets and Wouters (2003) to 12 quarters (Nelson
(1998), Batini and Nelson (2001), Batini (2002)).
We can summarise these observations by three stylised facts or features:
1Levin and Piger (2004) evaluate persistence in in￿ation series for twelve industrial
countries within the context of a model that allows for structrual breaks. They ￿nd that
the degree of persistence of the process in terms of the sum of the AR coe￿cients is less
that 0.7 for the seven countries. Similarly, Taylor (2000) found evidence that US in￿ation
persistence has been lower during the period 1982-1999, compared to the period 1960{1979.
Similiar conclusion has been reached by Cogley and Sargent (2001), who provide evidence
that in￿ation persistence had varied widely over time and recently fallen considerably.
2Although oddly enough the Bank of England’s own model (BEQM) has the peak
impact at 6 quarters.
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Feature 2: The biggest e￿ect is (a) after 4Q, (b) after 8Q, (c) after 12 Q
(timing of Hump).
Feature 3: After 20 Q, the e￿ect on in￿ation is (a) 1%, (b) 5% of the
maximum.(persistence).
In the case of Feature 2, we take three di￿erent values for the timing,
corresponding to the moderate view (8Q), the Hawkish view (12Q) and the
rapid view (4Q). Likewise for Feature 3, we have two thresholds.
Another issue we tackle is the relationship of the in￿ation response and
the output response. Again, there is a common view that in￿ation peaks
after output, and the gap between the two peaks is about 4 Quarters3.
In this paper, we take a standard model of wage-setting behaviour with
nominal rigidity, as in Dixon and Kara (2005b). This is a Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium model which is microfounded, and can be calibrated
using standard reference values. We then embed in the model a range of
di￿erent dynamic pricing models, which include all of the main models that
have constant steady-state distributions of durations (see Dixon (2005))4.
Our approach is to model the steady-state distribution of contract lengths in
a way that enables us to isolate the e￿ect of the di￿erent models of dynamic
wage-setting. There are basically 4 di￿erent types of "contract":
￿ The wage is set in nominal terms for a ￿xed and known period (e.g.
Taylor (1980),Fuhrer and Moore (1995))
￿ The wage is set in nominal terms with the duration being random
(e.g.Calvo (1983))
￿ There is a ￿xed or uncertain contract length, and the ￿rm/union sets
the wage for each period at the beginning of the contract (e.g. Fischer
(1977), Mankiw and Reis (2002)).
3Another stylised fact that has attracted much attention is the persistent response of
aggregate output to monetary shocks. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) demonstrate
the challenge facing models with staggered price contracts of Taylor in accounting for
the observed output persistence in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Various
mechanisms have been proposed to meet this challenge. (see Dixon and Kara (2005b) for
a discussion).
4The main model that does not have a steady state distribution of durations is the
state-dependent pricing model such as Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999).
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nal wage is updated by recent in￿ation (Indexation) 5: (e.g.Woodford
(2003)6).
The main innovation of this paper is to put these models of wage-setting
into a general framework that allows for an explicit and consistent examina-
tion of the distribution of contract lengths and its relation to the persistence
of in￿ation. We consider 3 groups of models. First, we have the Generalised
Taylor Economy (GTE) set out in Dixon and Kara (2005b), in which there
are many sectors, each with a Taylor contract of a particular length. Second,
the Generalised Fischer Economy (GFE) in which there are many sectors
each one with a Fischer contract of a particular length. The Mankiw-Reis
Sticky-information (SI) model is a special case of the GFE with the Calvo
distribution of contract lengths. Thirdly, we have Hybrid Phillips Curve
models (HPC) which can arise either through Taylor-type contracts (as in
the Fuhrer and Moore (1995)) or through indexation/bounded rationality
(Woodford (2003), Kiley (2005)).
The approach of the paper is to compare a range of models in a consistent
way and to see what is the role of key parameters in changing the properties
of the models in terms of in￿ation persistence. We ask the question in
two stages. First we take standard calibrations of the SDGE model and
see to what extent the di￿erent models meet the three Stylised features (in
either weak or strong forms). The second approach is to ask what would
be required in terms of contract length, distribution of contract lengths or
parameter values for the model to satisfy the Features.
The conclusions of the paper can be brie￿y summarised as follows. On
Feature 1, all of the models have hump-shaped responses except for Calvo,
which never has a hump. On Feature 2, at standard parameter values, the
only way to get hump at 4, 8 or 12 quarters is to have average contract lengths
of that magnitude: the easiest way to have this is the simple Taylor model.
Of course, whilst 4Q is plausible as an empirical magnitude, most would
5A variation on the indexing model can also be seen as a rule-of-thumb approach to
wage and price setting as in Gali and Gertler (1999): part of the economy optimises, the
other part just updates using past in￿ation.
6Other examples includes Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2003). In Christiano et al. (2005), indexing occurs in periods in which wage/price
setters are not allowed to re-optimize their prices. Smets and Wouters (2003) instead use
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condition: Calvo can have long average lifetimes of contracts, but sill never
develop a hump in the ￿rst place, and others such as the Sticky-information
model will have humps that peak before the average lifetime.
Second, we take the key parameter ￿, which measure the sensitivity of the
optimal ￿exible wage to output. We ￿nd that as this becomes lower, models
with a distribution of contract lengths have the hump later if they have
Taylor, Fischer or Indexed contracts but not in the case of Calvo contracts.
For example, at the very low value put forward by Fuhrer and Moore (1995),
several models have humps at 8Q and beyond. It is also possible to have the
hump occurring after the average contract length.
Lastly, we consider the timing of the in￿ation hump in response to the
output hump. Again, the Calvo model does worst: in￿ation always peaks
before output. We ￿nd that for ￿ is important again: it determines the
degree of in￿ationary pressure in response to an increase in output: for lower
values of ￿ we ￿nd that several models have peaks in output around 4Q
before the peak in in￿ation.
We believe that the distribution of contract lengths plays a vital role in
understanding the response of in￿ation to monetary policy. On its own it
does not solve the "puzzle", but it suggests a better way forward than the
ad hoc and unrealistic device of grafting on Indexation to the Calvo model7.
The best approach is to choose the model of wage or price setting that best
characterises behaviour and model the distribution of contract lengths using
empirical data.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
basic structure of the Economy and outlines the GTE framework. Section 3,
4, 5 consider the three groups of models: the Generalised Taylor Economy
(GTE), the Generalised Fischer Economy (GFE), Hybrid Phillips Curve
models (HPC); respectively and each section examines to what extent the
model meet the three stylised features and also discusses what would be
required in terms of contract length for the model to satisfy the features.
Section 6 considers what happens as the key parameter ￿ varies. Section 7
examines the timing of the in￿ation hump in response to the output hump.
Section 8 concludes. The details of the derivation of the structural equations
7As Woodford (2006) points out when discussing Calvo with indexation "there are
number of reasons to doubt the correctness of this model as an explanation of US (or
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2 The Model
The model that we use is the GTE framework of Dixon and Kara (2005b),
which can be interpreted as the log-linearized equilibrium conditions of a
DGE model in which there are potentially many sectors, each with a Taylor
contract of a particular length. The unique feature of the GTE framework
is that it allows us to model any distribution of contract lengths, including
the one generated by the Calvo model. The details of the derivation of the
structural equations can be found in Dixon and Kara (2005b) and we provide
a brief summary is in the appendix. The main di￿erence is that we generalise
the framework to allow for di￿erent types of contract from the Taylor case
of a ￿xed nominal wage for the duration of the contract.
2.1 Structure of the Economy
The Detailed structure of the model is outlined in Dixon and Kara (2005b)
and a brief summary is in the appendix. In the model economy, there is a
continuum of ￿rms f 2 [0;1], each producing a single di￿erentiated good,
which are combined to produce a ￿nal consumption good: The production of
intermediate goods requires labour as the only input. Corresponding to the
continuum of ￿rms f there is a unit interval of household-unions. The econ-
omy is divided into many sectors where the i￿th sector has a contract length
of i periods. The share of each sector is given by ￿i with
PN
i=1 ￿i = 1:
Within each sector i, each ￿rm is matched with a ￿rm-speci￿c union and
there are i cohorts of equal size. The representative household-union derives
utility form consumption, real money balances and leisure. The represen-
tative household-union in each sector chooses the reset wage to maximize
lifetime utility given labour demand and the additional constraint that the
contract will be in force for i periods. In any given period, in each sector a
cohort will come to the end of its contract period and set the new contract.
There are three types of contract considered:
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(Calvo);
￿ There is a ￿xed and known contract length, and the ￿rm/union sets
the wage for each period at the beginning of the contract;
￿ The initial wage is set, but through the contract length the nominal is
updated by recent in￿ation.
In Dixon and Kara (2005a), we considered the ￿rst type of contract only
and focussed on the GTE. We start ￿rst with the case of GTE and then
consider di￿erent type of contracts.
2.2 The log-linearised economy
In the appendix, we provide a full description of the model and the di￿erent
wage-setting equations under the 4 di￿erent types of contract. In this section
we will simply present the log-linearised macroeconomic framework common
to all approaches (which di￿er only in the type of contract considered).
Sectoral price level is given by the average wage set in the sector, and the
wage is averaged of the i cohorts in sector i:






The sectoral output level yit can be expressed as a function of the sectoral
price relative to the aggregate price level pt and aggregate output yt where
the coe￿cient ￿ is the elasticity of demand:
yit = ￿(pt ￿ pit) + yt (1)






The in￿ation rate is given by ￿t = pt ￿ pt￿1.
Aggregate demand is given by a simple Quantity Theory relation:
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The money supply follows a AR(1) process;
mt = mt￿1 + ln(￿t); ln(￿t) = v:ln￿t￿1 + ￿t (4)
where 0 < v < 1 and ￿t is a white noise process with zero mean and a ￿nite
variance.
2.3 Wage setting rules
All the models we use share the common macroeconomic framework embod-
ied in the log linearised equations of the previous section. They di￿er in
the wage-setting rules implied by the di￿erent nature of contracts. In this
section we will brie￿y outline the main rules (details are in the appendix).
Before de￿ning the optimal wage setting rules, let us de￿ne the optimal
wage which would occur if wages were perfectly ￿exible: "the optimal ￿ex
wage". The optimal ￿ex wage in each sector8 is given by
w
￿
t = pt + ￿yt (5)





Where ￿cc = ￿UccC
Uc is the parameter governing risk aversion, ￿LL =
￿VLLH
VL
is the inverse of the labour elasticity, ￿ is the elasticity of substitution of
consumption goods.
In the GTE, the reset wage in sector i is simply the average (expected)










Note that the reset wages will in general di￿er across sectors, since they take
the average over a di￿erent time horizon.
8Note that the optimal ￿ex wage in each sector is the same: this is because it is based
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Suppose an i period contract starts at t, the sequence of wages chosen from















which is the best guess of each cohort for the optimal ￿ex wage to be holding
at t. This embodies the "sticky information" idea in Fischer contracts: part
of current wages are based on old information.
In both the Calvo model and its extension with (full) indexation, when
the wage is set it is not known how long the contract will last9: thus in all
sectors the reset wage is the same. With indexation the reset wage equation
is:
xt = ! (pt + ￿yt) + (1 ￿ !)xt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ !)￿t
which is the standard Calvo reset equation with the additional in￿ation term.
The evolution of the aggregate wage index is given by
wt = !xt + (1 ￿ !)(wt￿1 + ￿t￿1)
Again, indexation introduces the additional in￿ation term into the standard
Calvo equation. In the appendix we also derive the Fuhrer-Moore wage
setting rule and the GTE with indexation.
2.4 The Choice of parameters
We have chosen a range of parameters and performed a grid search: there are
two main parameters which determine the shape of the in￿ation response:
the value of ￿ (the e￿ect of the output on wage-setting) and the value of ￿
(the serial correlation of monetary growth). As discussed in Dixon and Kara
(2005b), there are a range of values that are consistent with a microfounded
model. We take as our reference point ￿ = 0:2. However, if we think in
terms of a lower level of what is plausible, we take ￿ = 0:1 We can keep
￿ = ￿CC = 1 and ￿LL = 4:5 : if ￿ = 10 (as in Chari et al. (2000)) we get a
value of ￿ = 0:12. Throughout the paper, there are standard or reference
9As argued in Dixon and Kara (2005b), the Calvo setup can be seen as a game of
incomplete information, where ￿rms or unions do not know which sector they belong to
when they set the price/wage.
14
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important to note that non-microfounded econometric estimates of ￿ tend
to be much smaller: Taylor (1980) estimates ^ ￿ = 0:05, Coenen and Levin
(2004) ^ ￿ = 0:003 ￿ 0:01;Fuhrer and Moore (1995) ^ ￿ = 0:00510. We will
also report on these values when appropriate as a point of reference. So, our
reference set for ￿ are f0:2;0:1;0:05;0:01;0:005g. It should be noted that
more recent papers have argued that the presence of ￿rm-speci￿c capital can
lead to lower values of ￿: Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2004),
Coenen and Levin (2004), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Smets, Wouters
and de Walque (2005), Woodford (2003).
When it comes to the serial correlation of money growth ￿, this has been
estimated to be ￿ = 0:57 by Chari et al. (2000): Mankiw and Reis (2002) use
the value of ￿ =0.5, Huang, Liu and Phaneuf (2004) use a value of ￿ = 0:68.
We have simulated both extreme values ￿ 2 f0:5;0:75g and have found it
makes little di￿erence in terms of our three features. In the paper, all of the
reported simulations are undertaken with a low value of ￿ = 0:5.
3 In￿ation Persistence in a Generalised Tay-
lor Economy (GTE)
Before we explore the general case of the GTE, we can recap on the standard
cases of the Calvo model and the simple Taylor (ST) model. The Calvo
(1983) pricing model has a single parameter: the reset probability or hazard
rate !, which gives the non-duration dependent probability that a ￿rm/union
will have the option to reset its wage in any period. Figure 1 illustrates the
impulse response function of in￿ation to a one percent innovation in the
money supply:
Figure 1
As the ￿gure shows, the Calvo model cannot deliver a hump shaped in￿ation
response: the maximum is always in the ￿rst period (unless one imposes some
ex-ante pricing). As is well known (see Woodford (2003) for a discussion),
the purely forward looking nature of the Calvo model is the main reason for
this result. On the other hand, the model does not have any problem in




Working Paper Series No 672
September 2006generating persistence. Feature 3 can be met if we choose the reset prob-
ability low enough. Certainly, for any !, the exponential-like nature of the
decay means that the e￿ect does not disappear even after 20 quarters: as
shown with the popular value of ! = 0:25 and ! = 0:4 (which correspond to
average contract lengths of 7 and 4 quarters respectively as shown in Dixon
and Kara (2005a)). The value ! = 0:25 there is a enough persistence to meet
the stronger criteria (a); with ! = 0:4, enough to meet the weaker criterion
(b).
The failure of the Calvo model to generate the observed responses of
in￿ation suggests that the missing element might be backward-lookingness.
The intertemporal backward-looking and forward-looking e￿ects in Taylor
model are emphasized by Taylor (1980). We now investigate this possibility.
Figure 2 displays the impulse response function of in￿ation in the Taylor’s
staggered contract model: for contract lengths T = 2;4;6;8:
Figure2
As ￿gure 2 shows the maximum in￿ation response in Taylor’s model is
indeed delayed for several quarters and reaches its peak T ￿1 quarters after
the ￿rst period in which the shock occurs11. There is a hump shape of sorts,
but a rather jagged one. Hence Features 1 and 2 can be met. However,
the simple Taylor contract will only generate a hump at around 2 years if
the contract lasts for that length of time (T = 8). Most authors think that
T = 4 is more realistic and few would argue that the economy consists of
2￿year contracts with constant nominal wages. Thus Feature 2 can only
be met if there is an implausibly long contract length. Furthermore, if we
turn to Feature 3, in￿ation dies away rapidly T periods after the shock. In
particular, for T = 4, the e￿ects of the shock are almost gone by 15 periods
and certainly fails to meet even the weak criterion.
3.1 Generalised Taylor Economy (GTE)
What the previous analysis of simple Taylor contracts suggests is if we want
to generate a smoother hump-shaped impulse response which dies away more
11Every cohort setting their wage from the period of the shock sets the wage knowing the
innovation in the money supply. The last cohort to set its wage without this information
is the one which set its wage the period before the innovation. Its contract ends T ￿ 1
periods after the shock: in￿ation peaks when this cohort resets its wage.
16
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this possibility by using the GTE developed in Dixon and Kara (2005b). The
economy is divided into many sectors where the i￿th sector has a simple
Taylor contract length of T = i periods and a share of ￿i in the economy:
Let the n￿vector of contract lengths be denoted ￿ 2 ￿n￿1. This vector
characterizes the GTE, which can be written as GTE (￿). We will now
consider some special GTEs
3.1.1 Calvo-GTE
Let us ￿rst consider the Calvo-GTE, in which the share of each duration is
the same as generated by the Calvo model:
￿i = !
2i(1 ￿ !)
i￿1 : i = 1:::1
For computational purposes, we truncate the distribution at i = 20 and put
all of the mass of the contracts j ￿ 20 onto i = 20. We show the Calvo-GTE
for ! = 0:25; which has a mean contract length of 7 quarters and a modal
length of 3 and 4 quarters. The in￿ation impluse-response is depicted for
this in Fig.3, with the corresponding Calvo impulse-response from Figure 1
superimposed.:
Figure3:
The two economies in Figure 3 have the same distribution of contract lengths
(except for the fact that the Calvo-GTE is truncated at 20 quarters). They
di￿er in the wage-setting decisions: in the calvo model the wage-setters do
not know the length of their contract, but have a probability distribution over
contract lengths and hence all wage-setters set the same price. In the Calvo-
GTE each wage-setter knows its contract length when it sets the wage. As
we can see, in terms of Feature 1, the Calvo-GTE does have a hump shape.
However, with ! = 0:25; the hump appears in the third quarter. However,
re￿ecting the long tail of the contract lengths in the Calvo distribution, there
is lots of persistence in the tail with in￿ationary e￿ects lasting 20 quarters
and beyond. In order to get the hump at the 8 quarter a value of ! = 0:1
is required, which implies an average contract length of 19 quarters which is
implausibly long. Hence moving from the Calvo pricing rule to the Taylor
approach with the same distribution of contract lengths lets us satisfy Feature
1 in addition to Feature 3. The timing of the hump is still well below the
average lifetime of contracts in the economy.
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We can construct a distribution of duration data using the Bils and Klenow
(2004) data set. This is for price data, but we use it as an illustrative data
set. The data is derived from the US Consumer Price Index data collected
by the Bureau of Labor statistics. The period covered is 1995-7, and the
350 categories account for 69% of the CPI. The data set gives the average
proportion of prices changing per month for each category. We assume that
this is generated by a simple Calvo process within each sector. We can then
generate the distribution of durations for that category using Dixon and Kara
(2005a). We can then sum over all sectors using the category weights. We
depict the distribution in terms of quarters in Figure 4.
Fig4 : BK ￿ GTE : Distribution.
Note that the mean contract length is 4.4 quarters. There is a very long
tail, with some very long contracts: over 3% of weighted categories have less
than 5% of prices changing per month, implying average contract lengths of
over 40 months (13.5Q). However, the most common contracts durations
is 1 Quarter; the distribution looks a bit like a geometric distribution, at
least in the feature that the longer the duration, the lower its share of the
population.
Fig5 : BK ￿ GTE : I ￿ R
If we consider the IR for the BK ￿ GTE, this gives us a hump shape
that peaks at the second quarter but dies away gradually so that Feature 3
is met. We can see that the timing of the hump seems to be close with the
most common contract durations: this is perhaps not surprising, since it is
at this moment when the most wages are being reset after the innovation.
4 Generalised Fischer Economy (GFE)
In this section we consider an economy with many sectors, in which contract
lengths can di￿er. As in the GTE, this can be represented by a vector of
sectoral shares ￿ 2 ￿n￿1 where sector i = 1:::n have contract lengths i.
The di￿erence between a GFE and a GTE is in the nature of the contract:
with a Fischer contract, the wage-setter chooses a trajectory of wages, one
for each period for the whole length of the contract as in Fischer (1977).
The wages set are thus conditional on the information the agent has when
18
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more out of date. An alternative interpretation is that the ￿rm sets its
wage or price optimally each period, but that it only updates its information
infrequently. We believe the latter interpretation is less plausible changes in
demand should be obvious to the ￿rm
There are two general points that need to be understood when interpret-
ing the Fischer contracts. First, the IR functions are generated by a single
innovation in the initial period. The initial shock is perpetuated because
we assume that money follows an AR(1) process. However, in terms of in-
formation, any new contract that starts after the initial shock will be fully
informed. Once all contracts have been renewed after the shock, the econ-
omy will behave as if there is full information and ￿exible wages/prices: i.e.
the only in￿ation will be generated by what remains of the monetary AR(1)
process. The second point is that the length of the contract has no in￿uence
on the wages chosen for any speci￿c period. This is because a separate wage
can be chosen for each period within the contract. So, it makes no di￿erence
to the wage chosen for period 2 of the contract whether the contract last
for 2 periods or 1000. Its period 2 wage will be its best guess at what the
optimal wage is going to be in period 2 of the contract.
4.1 Simple Fischer Economy
We will start out by considering an economy in which there is only one
contract length, analogous to the simple Taylor economy. We depict the IR
functions for he cases where contracts last for T = 4;6;8;10 quarters:
Fig6 : SF ￿ IR
If we compare Figure 6 with Figure 2, there are similarities and di￿er-
ences. The similarity is the shape: we have a jagged hump, with a peak
T ￿ 1 periods after the shock. The di￿erence is that the ascent to the peak
accelerates more with the SF economy, and the drop from the peak is even
more precipitous. The second feature is easy to understand. T ￿ 1 peri-
ods after the shock, all contracts have been renewed since the shock, so are
now fully informed. Wage in￿ation simply follows the money growth. The
￿rst di￿erence is simple as well: recall that in the steady state prior to the
monetary shock at time t there is zero in￿ation, so all wage-plans involve
constant wages. In period t, when the shock hits, the current cohort revise
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T of ￿rms are
still setting the old wage, so this holds down the wage reset for period t :
in period t + 1 T￿2
T of ￿rms are still setting the new prices. There are now
two cohorts who are able to set prices re￿ecting the monetary innovation at
time t, so they plan a higher price. In each subsequent period fewer wages
at the old steady-state wage until T ￿ 1 periods after the shock, no wages
re￿ect the pre-shock steady state and wages are at the fully ￿exible values
and output is at its natural rate.
The SF economy will fail Feature 3: unless it has contracts in excess of
20 quarters, in￿ation just follows what is left of monetary growth: with an
autoregressive coe￿cient of 0:5 this will be negligible after 20quarters. The
SF will satisfy Feature 1, and also Feature 2 but only if the contracts are
long enough.
4.2 Mankiw and Reis’s sticky information (SI) model
Mankiw and Reis’s Sticky Information model (SI) is a GFE where the dis-
tribution of contract lengths is Calvo with their choice of ! = 0:25, resulting
in an average length of 7 quarters. The parameter ! is presented as a "re-
plan" probability: just as in the Calvo model, when the trajectory of wages
is chosen at the outset of the contract, the wage-setter does not know how
long it will last but has a subjective distribution over the lifetime. However,
as we have noted, the length of the contract has no in￿uence on the wage-
setting behaviour. Hence the SI model as presented by Mankiw and Reis
is exactly the same as a Calvo-GFE: an economy where there is a Calvo
distribution of contract lengths but in which each wage setter knows exactly
how long the contract will run for. With Fischer contracts, the Calvo reset
probability is only important in generating the distribution: nothing else.
Fig7 : SF ￿ T = 7;SI ￿ ! = 0:25
In Figure 7 we depict the IR functions for two GFE’s: the SI model
with ! = 0:25 and the SF with the same mean contract length. The SF
has the jagged peak property as in Figure 6, with negligible in￿ation after
7 quarters. In contrast, the SI model has a smooth hump, peaking at the
4th quarter, and in￿ation dies away slowly so that Feature 3 is satis￿ed by
the weak criterion. The reason for this shape is the distribution of contract
lengths and in particular the longer contracts that let in￿ation persist. As
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coe￿cient 0:5, the total cumulative e￿ect of in￿ation in all models is 2%. In
the long-run money is neutral. The long tail of in￿ation persistence must
imply a lower peak, since adding up in￿ation over all periods gives the same
answer for all models: 2%. Note that in Mankiw and Reis (2002), they
parameterise ￿ = 0:1, whilst Figure 7 is based on our baseline value ￿ = 0:2,
and leads to an earlier peak. We will discuss the role of ￿ later in the paper.
5 Hybrid Phillips Curve Models
There has been much empirical work done on the New Keynesian Phillips
curve. As is well known, it does not do well in explaining the data (see for
example Gali and Gertler (1999). Empirically, a model which does much
better is the hybrid Phillips curve, which takes the form
￿t = a￿Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ a)￿t￿1 + byt (8)
where a 2 [0;1] and a = 1 gives the New Keyesian Phillips curve. This
has given rise to several attempts to have a theoretical model that can give
something like this. The theoretical justi￿cation can be found by adding
indexation to the Calvo model (see for example Christiano et al. (2005),
Smets and Wouters (2003)), or by the Fuhrer and Moore model. Although
indexation is often used, many people are not comfortable with it: it is more of
a regrettable necessity than a "microfoundation", since there is little evidence
of the sort of indexation required occurring. In Fuhrer and Moore’s model
wages are set in nominal terms as in Taylor contracts, but the objective
function is di￿erent: the, relative real wage is targeted. As Driscoll and
Holden (2003) have argued, the model is not plausible in this respect and if
done in a more consistent manner does not yield the same result. However,
here we take the models as given and merely seek to explore the quantitative
dynamic properties displayed by them.
5.1 Fuhrer and Moore’s(1995) in￿ation persistence model
In the special case of two period Taylor contracts, the FM model gives rise
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at any moment of time there is a proportion ￿s of contracts which are s
periods old. As shown in Dixon (2005), this corresponds to a distribution of
completed contract lengths of ￿i:with a mean length ￿ T = 3:2:
Age ￿s Lifetime ￿i
￿1 = 0:37 ￿1 = 0:08
￿2 = 0:29 ￿2 = 0:16
￿3 = 0:21 ￿3 = 0:24
￿4 = 0:13 ￿4 = 0:52
Table 1: Contract Durations in FM
Fig8 : FM and FM ￿ GTE
In Figure 8 we depict the IR for the FM model and the FM-GTE, where
the latter has the standard wage-setting rule, but with the same distribution
of contract lengths as the FM model. As we can see, the FM model has
a hump shape which reaches a peak at quarters 3 and 4 (there is a ￿at top
to the hump). So, in this case the FM model satis￿es Feature 1 and the
weakest form of Feature 2. However, the e￿ect falls of rapidly and becomes
negative, so that there is not enough persistence to satisfy Feature 3. In
contrast the FM-GTE clearly peaks at 3 quarters but also dies away so that
Feature 3 is not satis￿ed.
5.2 Calvo with Full Indexation: Woodford (2003)
The second hybrid Phillips curve approach is to allow for the full indexation
of contracts in between reset decisions. That is, at the beginning of the
contract the nominal wage is set. For the rest of the contract duration this
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! = 0:25 and ￿ = 0:2: As the ￿gure illustrates introducing backward looking
indexation can a￿ect the impact of the shock on in￿ation and leads to a hump
shape response. The model can satisfy Feature 1 and the weakest form of
Feature 2. However, even though the average contract length in this economy
is quite long i.e. 7 quarters, the model fails to generate enough persistence
to satisfy Feature 3.
Fig 9: Calvo with Full Indexation.
5.3 GTE with Full Indexation
We now consider a modi￿cation to the above model and replace Calvo style
contracts with Taylor style contracts. In Figure 11, we report the response
of in￿ation in the simple Taylor economy.
Fig 10: Simple Taylor 4 with Full Indexation
As the ￿gure shows; allowing for the indexation of contracts does not
a￿ect the timing of the hump in the simple Taylor with our reference value
of ￿ = 0:2, which stands in sharp contrast to that obtained in the Calvo
Model. As discussed earlier, the main di￿erence between the two models is
their contract structures. We can use the Calvo-GTE approach, which has
exactly the same contract structure as in the Calvo Model to see whether
the presence of a range of contract lengths in the Calvo Model is the main
reason behind this result.
Fig 11: GTE with Full Indexation
Figure 11 reports the response of in￿ation in the Calvo ￿ GTE with
indexation. We assume that ! = 0:25; as in the Calvo with indexation: We
also include the response of in￿ation in the IC. As the ￿gure shows in both
models in￿ation peaks at the same time, which indicates that a presence of
a distribution in the Calvo model is the main reason behind the result.
As in the IC, the model can satisfy Feature 1 and the weakest form
of Feature 2 but fails to generate enough persistence to satisfy Feature 3.
However, allowing for a lower value of ￿ can potentially a￿ect the results.
We will discuss the role of ￿ later in the text.
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moving average
In Kiley, a slightly di￿erent approach to indexation is adopted. Rather than
have Calvo resetting with indexation in between resets, Kiley proposes a
model with two di￿erent types of wage-setters: a proportion (1 ￿ a) are Calvo
wage setters of the orthodox kind, and a proportion a are "rule of thumb"
agents who update using lagged in￿ation, where lagged in￿ation is a moving
average over the last b periods. Kiley’s model is a model formulated for
econometric estimation and so is not directly comparable to the other models
presented. The main di￿erence is that he uses marginal cost rather than the
output gap. However, we can reformulate his model into a form directly
comparable to the others in the paper by assuming that the Calvo resetters
base the wage-setting decision on the MRS between consumption and leisure
as in Woodford’s 2003 model. This results in a HPC of the form:









in which Woodford (2003) is a special case when b = 1 and a = 0:5. Our
adaptation of Kiley’s approach has 4 parameters: fa;b;￿; !g This is a
relatively larger parameter space than the other models considered. We will
take the value of ￿ = 0:2 and consider the two cases considered by Kiley for
fa;bg = f0:24;1g and f0:17;4g with two values of ! = 0:25 and 0:4.
Fig 12: Kiley’s Moving average indexation.
As we can see from Figure 12, there is a hump, but it peaks well before
8Q and does not even make 4Q even when ! = 0:25 with an average contract
length of 7Q.
6 What is the e￿ect of ￿?
In this section, we consider what happens as ￿ varies. Now, as we have
discussed previously, the values of ￿ put forward in di￿erent studies vary
by huge magnitudes: with price-setting values well over 1: with wage-setting
microfounded values should be calibrated at around 0:2 or 0:1 perhaps; FM
estimates a value of 0:005. In this section we want to take all of the models
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in terms of Features 1-3: In Table 2 we show how Features 1-3 fare for
each of the models at di￿erent reference levels of ￿ : the benchmark level 0:2,
0:1;0:05;0:01; and 0:005. Where there are weak and strong criteria (Features
2 and 3) the more ticks indicates the stronger criteria being met.
Table2 Features 1-3 as ￿ varies.
Let us ￿rst take the benchmark case, which we have already explored.
The only models to satisfy all three Features are the T = 8 simple Taylor
case and the SI with ! = 0:25, although the SI only meets the weak Feature
2 (peaks at 4Q). Thus having long contracts is necessary but certainly
not su￿cient to satisfy the stronger version of F2: the weaker 4Q version is
satis￿ed by several, but they all fail F3 except for SI with ! = 0:25. Turning
to ￿ = 0:1, the value adopted by Mankiw and Reis (2002), we see that SI
meets the strong criterion for Features 2 and 3. The Calvo-GTE and Calvo
with Indexation (both with ! = 0:25) both satisfy the 4Q peak and the
strong version of Feature 3.
Jumping to ￿ = 0:005, the FM value, something interesting happens. At
this low value of ￿ many models pass all three features: Strong Feature 2 and
3 are satis￿ed by: Simple Taylor 8, Calvo-GTE (! = 0:25), BK ￿ GTE,
SI(! = 0:25), FM, Calvo with Indexation (! = 0:4;! = 0:25), Simple Taylor
4 with indexation. Weak Feature 2 and strong 3 are also met by Simple
Taylor 4, Calvo-GTE (! = 0:4), FM ￿ GTE: The important thing to note
is that at low values of ￿, models without long average contract lengths
and backward looking indexation are showing peaks at 8Q or beyond. The
main conclusion to note is that this only happens in models where there is a
distribution of contract lengths: for example the BK ￿GTE has an average
of 4:4 quarters, but peaks at 10 quarters. Indeed, this is best illustrated if
we just look at the peak for di￿erent values of ￿ in Table 3:
Table3: The peak response.
Note is that as ￿ varies some models do not change peak at all. These
are the Calvo model: the peak is always at 1, and the simple models with just
one contract length: simple Taylor and simple Fischer. In all other cases, as
￿ decreases, the peak gets pushed further back: and in all other cases there
is a distribution of contract lengths. In just three models is the distribution
truncated: in FM and FM-GTE there are no contracts longer than 4Q,
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SI, Calvo-GTE, Indexed Calvo, BK-GTE, Calvo-GTE there are some very
long contracts which for practical computational purposes are truncated.
This brings us to our conclusion about ￿. When there is a distribution
of contracts, an decrease in ￿ will tend to delay the maximum impact if there
is already a hump shape. Note also that the assumption of indexation can
a￿ect the timing of the in￿ation peak in models with one type of contract
length if ￿ is su￿ciently low but it has a larger e￿ect on the in￿ation peak
in models with a distribution.
7 Output and in￿ation
"We cannot be precise about the size or timing of all these
channels. But the maximum e￿ect on output is estimated to take
up to about one year. And the maximum impact of a change in
interest rates on consumer price in￿ation takes up to about two
years" the Bank of England’s webpage12.
Up until now we have been looking at in￿ation persistence on its own.
However, it has long been argue that in￿ation peaks after output: the initial
increase in output generates the upward pressure on prices. For example,
Christiano et al. (2005) ￿nd that in￿ation peaks at 8Q and output at 4Q. The
Bank of England Quarterly Model has in￿ation peaking at 6Q and output at
3Q. The above quote from the Bank of England on monetary policy re￿ects
this conventional view.
Clearly, the dynamic of output and in￿ation are governed at the aggregate
level by the quantity identity: (3): the sum of in￿ation and output growth
must add up to the rate of monetary growth in each period. The role of
￿ is very important: it determines the in￿ationary pressure on wages and
prices resulting from an increase in output. A low value of ￿ means that
this in￿ationary pressure works through more slowly so that the reaction of
in￿ation to output growth becomes slower. This also means that growth in
output can be sustained for longer because the in￿ationary response is being
delayed. The cumulative e￿ect on in￿ation is ￿xed at 2%, since money
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the long-run equilibrium.
For both Calvo and simple Taylor, whilst the timing of the peak impact
on in￿ation does not depend on ￿, the peak impact on output does. In the
case of Calvo, in￿ation always peaks on impact, and the output hump peaks
later with lower ￿. For all of the models with a distribution of contract
lengths (except Calvo), ￿ a￿ects both the timing of the output and in￿ation
humps, having a larger e￿ect on the in￿ation peak.
Table4: output and in￿ation
In Table 4 we state the timing of the peak output growth and the dif-
ference between the peak in￿ation and output. In the ￿rst table we can see
that in all models, the lower is ￿; the more delayed is the response of output.
In the case of Calvo, in￿ation always peaks on impact, and the output hump
peaks later with lower ￿. This indicates that not only does the standard
Calvo model generate the wrong in￿ation dynamics, but also reverses the
relative timing of output and in￿ation peaks providing yet another reason
against the use of the Calvo model. In the simple Taylor and Fischer mod-
els, in￿ation peaks at the length of the contract, output peaks earlier with a
smaller gap when ￿ is lower.
The most interesting thing to note about Table 4 is that for all of the
models except simple Taylor, Simple Fischer and Calvo, not only is the peak
in￿ation after the output hump, but also the gap between the humps increases
as ￿ gets smaller. We can illustrate this with the BK-GTE:
Fig13: output and in￿ation in BK ￿ GTE
In Fig 13a we depict the IR for output and in￿ation with the reference
value of ￿ = 0:2 there is a hump in in￿ation which peaks at 2Q and output
at 3Q. However, with the lower value of ￿ = 0:01, in￿ation peaks at 7Q and
output at 4Q.
8 Conclusion
We have used the Generalized Taylor Economy, GTE, framework to evaluate
the performance of competing approaches for modelling nominal rigidities in
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￿ation dynamics. Recent empricial studies ￿nd that a monetary shock leads
to a hump shaped persistent in￿ation response. Due to the lack of consen-
sus in the literature about the timing of the hump peak, we allow for three
di￿erent values which corresponds to the moderate view (8Q), the Hawkish
view (12Q) and the rapid view (4Q). We show how the assumptions regard-
ing the distribution of contract lengths and the key parameters a￿ect the
models’ implications on in￿ation dynamics. Our ￿ndings can be summarised
as follows:
￿ In models with one type of contract length in￿ation always reaches
its peak T ￿ 1 quarters after the ￿rst period in which shock occurs.
However, this type of model fails to generate enough persistence to
satisfy feature 3 with our reference value of ￿ = 0:2: When we allow for a
low value of ￿, which can be obtained, for example, by introducing ￿rm
speci￿c capital, the problem goes away in the case of Taylor contracts.
If you take the view that the hump peaks at 4 quarters, then the Simple
Taylor economy with average contract length of 4 can meet the three
stylised facts. However, going beyond the 4 quarters would only be
possible if the model has long contracts. On the other hand, the simple
Fischer model never generates enough persistence to satisfy Feature 3
unless it has contract lengths in excess of 20 quarters.
￿ The presence of a distribution of contract lengths has signi￿cant im-
plications on the models’ performance in accounting for the in￿ation
dynamics. In particular, these models do not have problem in generat-
ing persistent in￿ation response with plausible parameter values. The
main problem in this class of models is the timing of the hump. When
￿ = 0:2; most models cannot even make 4Q: The timing of the hump
seems to be close with the most common contract durations. However,
with a low value of ￿;these models can generate a hump at 8Q and even
beyond. In this case, the predictions of such models are also consistent
with the common view that in￿ation peaks after output, and the gap
between the two peaks is about 4 Quarters.
￿ The Calvo model does not capture in￿ation dynamics: in￿ation always
peaks on impact, and this precedes the peak in output. As ￿ gets
smaller, it does not a￿ect the timing of the peak in in￿ation, but it
does a￿ect the shape of the IR, and low values make the a￿ect die o￿
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in￿ation dynamics.
￿ The assumption of indexation can a￿ect the timing of the in￿ation
hump, having a larger e￿ect on the in￿ation peak in models with a
distribution. In particular, IC and IC ￿ GTE have very similar im-
plications on in￿ation dynamics. However, the lack of direct evidence
for the indexation makes this class of models less plausible.
These ￿ndings lead us to conclude that models with a distribution, along
with other frictions which helps to lower ￿; can be fairly successful in ex-
plaining the in￿ation dynamics following a monetary shock. In fact, this
￿nding, to a large extent, explains the result obtained by Coenen and Levin
(2004). Coenen and Levin (2004) show that a model with Taylor style con-
tracts that allows for ￿rm speci￿c capital and has a distribution of contract
lengths ￿ts the German data very well without needing the assumption of
backward-looking indexation. The same results also indicate that stronger
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A Model
In this section, we describe the GTE framework in detail and then discuss the
modi￿cations required to the model when we consider di￿erent assumption
regarding the wage-setting.
A.1 Generalised Taylor Economy (GTE)
A.1.1 Firms
There is a continuum of ￿rms f 2 [0;1]; each producing a single di￿erentiated
good Y (f), which are combined to produce a ￿nal consumption good Y: The
production function here is CES with constant returns and corresponding


























Each ￿rm f sets the price Pft and takes the ￿rm-speci￿c wage rate Wft as








Where ￿ ￿ 1 represents the degree of diminishing returns, with ￿ = 1 being
constant returns. The ￿rm chooses fPft;Yft;Lftg to maximize pro￿ts subject
to (11,12), yields the following solutions for price, output and employment
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where " = ￿










Price is a markup over marginal cost, which depends on the wage rate
and the output level (when ￿ < 1): output and employment depend on the
real wage and total output in the economy.
A.1.2 Uniform GTE: the structure of contracts.
The economy is divided into many sectors where the i￿th sector has a simple
Taylor contract length of T = i periods. The share of each sector is given
by ￿i with
PN
i=1 ￿i = 1: Since we consider only uniform GTEs, in each sector
i; there are i the cohorts which are of equal size. As a result, ￿ii￿1 contracts
are reset in each period in sector i.
A.1.3 Household-Unions and Wage Setting
Households h 2 [0;1] have preferences de￿ned over consumption, labour, and




















;Hht;Lht are household h0s consumption, end-of period
real money balances, hours worked, and leisure respectively, t is an index for
time, 0 < ￿ < 1 is the discount factor, and each household has the same ￿ow
utility function u, which is assumed to take the form
U(Cht) + ￿ ln(
Mht
Pt
) + V (1 ￿ Hht) (17)
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cohort within that sector (recall, that each household is twinned with ￿rm
f = h). Since the household acts as a monopoly union, hours worked are
demand determined, being given by the (15).







t+1) ￿ Mht￿1+Bht+WhtHht+￿ht+Tht (18)
where Bh(st+1) is a one-period nominal bond that costs Q(st+1 j st) at
state st and pays o￿ one dollar in the next period if st+1 is realized. Bht
represents the value of the household’s existing claims given the realized state
of nature. Mht denotes money holdings at the end of period t. Wht is the
nominal wage, ￿ht is the pro￿ts distributed by ￿rms and WhtHht is the labour
income. Finally, Tt is a nominal lump-sum transfer from the government.
The households optimization breaks down into two parts. First, there is
the choice of consumption, money balances and one-period nominal bonds to
be transferred to the next period to maximize expected lifetime utility (16)
given the budget constraint (18). The ￿rst order conditions derived from the


























Equation (19) is the Euler equation, (20) gives the gross nominal inter-
est rate and (21) gives the optimal allocation between consumption and real
balances. Note that the index h is dropped in equations (19) and (21), which
re￿ects our assumption of complete contingent claims markets for consump-
tion and implies that consumption is identical across all households in each
period (Cht = Ct)13:
Household h in sector i chooses wage to maximize lifetime utility given
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September 2006be ￿xed for Ti periods in which the aggregate output and price level are
givenfYt;Ptg. Since the reset wage at time t will only hold for Ti periods,






















7 7 7 7
5
(22)




t collects all of the terms in (15) which the union
treats as exogenous.
Equation (22) shows that the optimal wage is a constant "mark-up" (given
by "
"￿1) over the ratio of marginal utilities of leisure and marginal utility from
consumption within the contract duration, from t to t+Ti￿1: When Ti = 2,
this equation reduces to the ￿rst order condition in Ascari (2000).
A.2 Generalised Fischer Economy (GFE)
In a model with Fischer (1977) contracts, household h in sector i chooses
chooses a trajectory of wages, one for each period for the whole length of the














where s = 0:::Ti ￿ 1: Note that the equation is identical to the the wage
level in which wages are fully ￿exible.
A.3 Calvo with Indexation: Woodford (2003)
As in the simple Calvo (1983) pricing model, there is the reset probability
or hazard rate !, which gives the non-duration dependent probability that
a ￿rm/union will have the option to reset its wage in any period and house-
hold h chooses wage to maximize lifetime utility given labour demand (15)
during the lifetime of the contract. But now maximization problem also in-
cludes lagged in￿ation due to the assumption of indexation. The ￿rst order
condition is given by:
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where 0 ￿ a ￿ 1 measures the degree of indexation to the past in￿ation
rate. a = 0 gives the wage setting rule for the simple Calvo Economy. Note
that the index i is dropped in this equation due reason that in the Calvo
pricing model there is only one reset wage (see Dixon and Kara (2005b) for
a discussion).
A.4 The GTE with Indexation


































This section presents equation which are the linearized counterparts to the
equations outlined in the pervious section of the appendix. We start with
the wage-setting rules for di￿erent contracts. Lower-case letters denotes log-
deviations of variables from the steady state
B.1 Generalised Taylor Economy (GTE)
The linearized version of the equations described in the previous section are
follows. As in Dixon and Kara (2005b), the wage setting rule is summarised
for the reset wage which is set by the cohort changing contracts at t and
remains in force for i periods.
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￿LL + ￿cc(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿LL
(27)


















yt = mt ￿ pt (32)
In addition, the money supply follows a AR(1) process;
mt = mt￿1 + ln(￿t); ln(￿t) = v￿t￿1 + ￿t (33)
where 0 < v < 1 and ￿t is a white noise process with zero mean and a
￿nite variance.
B.2 Generalised Fischer Economy (GFE)
Log-Linearising version of (23) is given by
xit+s = pt+s + ￿yt+s (34)
Sectoral wage index can be expressed as
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Replacing (26) and (28) with (34) and (35) from the above equations,
respectively, gives the equilibrium conditions in the GFE:
B.3 Calvo with Indexation: Woodford (2003)
Log-Linearising (24) and putting for simplicity ￿ = a = 1 yields
xt = ! (pt + ￿yt) ￿ (1 ￿ !)￿t + (1 ￿ !)xt+1 (36)
The evolution of the aggregate wage index is given by
wt = !xt + (1 ￿ !)(wt￿1 + ￿t￿1) (37)
Finally, the aggregate price index is






By inserting (38) and (37) into (36), after some algebra, we obtain the
hybrid phillips curve reported in the main text.
B.4 GTE with Indexation
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September 2006B.5 Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and FM ￿ GTE
Fuhrer and Moore’s model does not have microfoundations. We modi￿ed
the equations to allow for an economy with many sectors, each with a Fuhrer
and Moore contract of a particular length. In this case, unions care about
relative real wages within the contract duration.







where fs = 1
Ti:












Equations (40) and (41) along with the equations (28)-(32) characterize
the equilibrium in the FM-GTE. When Ti = 4 and fs = 0:25 + (1:5 ￿ s)q;
q 2 (0; 1
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September 2006￿ 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.005
Calvo; !=0.40 1 1 1 1 1
Calvo; !=0.25 1 1 1 1 1
STE; T=4 4 4 4 4 4
STE; T=8 8 8 8 8 8
Calvo-GTE; !=0.40 2 3 4 5 6
Calvo-GTE; !=0.25 3 4 5 9 11
BK-GTE 2 2 2 7 10
GTE(with FM distr) 3 3 4 4 4
FM 4 4 4 7 8
SI; ! = 0:40 3 5 6 9 11
SI; ! = 0:25 5 8 11 16 19
SFE; T=4 4 4 4 4 4
SFE; T=8 8 8 8 8 8
IC; ! = 0:40 4 5 6 9 11
IC; ! = 0:25 5 6 8 13 16
IC-GTE; ! = 0:40 4 4 6 9 11
IC-GTE; ! = 0:25 5 6 8 13 16
Indexed-STE; T = 4 4 4 5 7 9
Table 3: The peak response of in￿ation (in quarters)
￿ 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.005
Calvo; !=0.40 -1 -2 -2 -3 -4
Calvo; !=0.25 -2 -2 -3 -4 -4
STE; T=4 2 2 1 1 0
STE; T=8 5 5 4 3 3
Calvo-GTE; !=0.40 0 0 1 1 2
Calvo-GTE; !=0.25 0 1 1 4 6
BK-GTE -1 -1 -1 3 5
GTE(with FM distr) 1 1 2 1 1
FM 2 2 2 4 5
SI; != 0:40 1 2 3 5 6
SI; != 0:25 2 4 7 10 13
SFE; T=4 2 2 1 1 1
SFE; T=8 4 4 3 2 2
IC; != 0:40 2 3 3 5 7
IC; != 0:25 2 3 5 9 11
IC-GTE; != 0:40 2 2 3 5 6
IC-GTE; != 0:25 3 5 8 11
Indexed-STE; T = 4 2 2 2 4 5
Table 4: The di￿etrence between the peaks
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September 2006Figure 1: Response of In￿ation in the Calvo Economy
Figure 2: Response of In￿ation in the Simple Taylor Economy
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September 2006Figure 3: Response of In￿ation in the Calvo-GTE and the Calvo Economy
Figure 4: BK ￿ GTE :Distribution
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September 2006Figure 5: Response of In￿ation in the BK-GTE
Figure 6: Response of In￿ation in the Simple Fischer Economy
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September 2006Figure 7: Response of In￿ation in the Simple Fischer Economy and SI
Figure 8: Response of In￿ation in the FM and FM-GTE
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September 2006Figure 9: Response of In￿ation in the Indexed-Calvo
Figure 10: Response of In￿ation in the Indexed-Taylor
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September 2006Figure 11: Response of In￿ation in the IC-GTE and IC
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September 2006Figure 12: Kiley’s Moving average indexation
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September 2006Figure 13: Output and In￿ation Responses in BK ￿ GTE
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